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 ___________ 
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        Appellant 
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 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States Tax Court  
 (T.C. No. 08-24302) 
 Tax Court Judge:  Honorable Thomas B. Wells 
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 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 21, 2011 
 
 Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  June 21, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David Jahn appeals from a decision of the Tax Court, arguing that the 
Commissioner should have been required to account for certain itemized deductions in 
calculating his tax deficiency and challenging the Tax Court’s imposition of a penalty 
pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 6673.  For the following reasons, we will 
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affirm. 
I. 
 This is the second time that Jahn is before us due to his failure to pay taxes.  In the 
first proceeding, which arose out of Jahn’s failure to file a tax return for the 2004 tax 
year, Jahn filed a petition in Tax Court arguing that the Commissioner should have been 
required to account for itemized deductions in the substitute return he prepared on Jahn’s 
behalf.  The Tax Court held that Jahn was not entitled to itemize deductions because he 
did not file a return relating to 2004.  Jahn v. Comm’r, T.C. Mem. 2008-141, 2008 WL 
2128229, at *1 (T.C. May 21, 2008).  On appeal, we affirmed the Tax Court’s holding 
that a taxpayer must file a return in order to itemize deductions.  Jahn v. Comm’r, 392 F. 
App’x 949, 950 (3d Cir. 2010). 
While that appeal was pending, Jahn was served with a notice of deficiency 
relating to the 2006 tax year.  Since Jahn had also failed to file a tax return for the 2006 
tax year, the Commissioner calculated Jahn’s deficiency by preparing a substitute return 
for him pursuant to I.R.C. § 6020(b).  As with the 2004 tax year, the Commissioner only 
allowed Jahn the standard deduction. 
 Jahn filed a petition in Tax Court, challenging the calculated deficiency as he did 
with the 2004 tax year because the substitute return did not account for itemized 
deductions.  In response, the Commissioner sent Jahn a letter requesting that he submit a 
return for the 2006 tax year in order to resolve the matter.  Jahn took the position that he 
“shouldn’t be required to prepare and sign under penalty of perjury documents which [he] 
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lack[s] the education and training to comprehend, and then potentially suffer fines and 
penalties or imprisonment due solely to [his] inability to understand and apply the 
complex tax laws to [his] situation.”  (Ex. 6-J.)  Accordingly, instead of preparing a 
return, Jahn submitted documentation of the deductions he sought and indicated that the 
Commissioner should prepare the return for him, taking those deductions into account. 
 The matter eventually proceeded to trial.  Jahn’s case rested on the premise that 
the government should not be able to “compel you to do something you really don’t have 
the education or training to do,” i.e., file a tax return.  (Trial Tr. 8.)  He also reiterated his 
assertion that he should be entitled to itemize deductions.  The Tax Court concluded that 
Jahn’s failure to file a return precluded his eligibility for itemized deductions, and held 
that the Commissioner had established a deficiency and additions to tax in the amounts 
reflected in the substitute return.  Additionally, the Tax Court imposed a $10,000 penalty 
on Jahn, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6673, for advancing frivolous arguments despite several 
warnings that his positions lacked merit.     
 Jahn timely filed a motion to vacate, which the Tax Court denied.  He then filed a 
timely appeal.   
II. 
 Our appellate jurisdiction arises under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a).  We exercise plenary 
review over the Tax Court’s legal conclusions, see PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 
F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000), and review its imposition of a penalty under § 6673 for 
abuse of discretion.  See Pollard v. Comm’r, 816 F.2d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1987) (per 
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curiam). 
In this appeal, Jahn continues to maintain that he is entitled to itemize deductions 
despite his failure to file a return.
1
  Jahn argues that I.R.C. § 63(e) allows a taxpayer to 
itemize regardless of who makes the return.  And since the substitute return prepared by 
the Commissioner constitutes a return for purposes of establishing tax liability and 
imposing additions to tax, Jahn argues that it constitutes a return for the purpose of 
electing to itemize under § 63(e).  We reject those arguments. 
“Unless an individual makes an election under [§ 63(e)] . . . , no itemized 
deduction shall be allowed for the taxable year.”  I.R.C. § 63(e)(1).  That election “shall 
be made on the taxpayer’s return.”  § 63(e)(2).  Given the I.R.C.’s clear statutory 
language, it is fairly obvious that, unless a taxpayer files a return and makes the 
appropriate election, he is not entitled to itemize.  See Maxwell v. United States, 80 F. 
Supp. 2d 1352, 1353-54 (N.D. Ga. 1999).   
                                                 
1
 The Commissioner asserts that collateral estoppel bars Jahn’s challenge because 
Jahn unsuccessfully pursued the same argument with respect to the 2004 tax year.  
Collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised initially in tax 
court.  See Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. United States, 888 F.2d 725, 727 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Sundstrand Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 226, 349 (1991).  
Since the Commissioner never raised the issue of collateral estoppel before the 
Tax Court, we decline to consider the matter for the first time on appeal.  See In re 
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261 (3d Cir. 2009).  We note, 
however, that we find the Commissioner’s position to be somewhat disingenuous 
since he opposed Jahn’s motion to stay the instant case pending our ruling in the 
earlier appeal on the basis that “the outcome of [the appeal in the prior case] will 
not have affect [sic] on the instant case” since “[e]ach taxable year stands alone.” 
(Comm’r’s Notice of Objection ¶ 4.) 
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Furthermore, although a substitute return prepared pursuant to I.R.C. § 6020(b) is 
treated like a return for certain purposes, it is not the equivalent of a return filed by the 
taxpayer.  Section 6020(b) authorizes the Secretary to prepare a substitute return for a 
taxpayer who has failed to file, which is “good and sufficient for all legal purposes except 
insofar as any Federal statute expressly provides otherwise.”  Treas. Reg. § 301.6020-
1(b)(3).  Among those valid purposes are assessing the taxpayer’s deficiency and 
determining addition to tax.  See I.R.C. §§ 6201(a)(1), 6651(g); United States v. Silkman, 
220 F.3d 935, 936 (8th Cir. 2000).  But the substitute return does not relieve the non-
filing taxpayer of his duty to file, see United States v. Lacy, 658 F.2d 396, 397 (5th Cir. 
1981) (per curiam), and does not equate to a filed return unless signed by the taxpayer.  
See In re Bergstrom, 949 F.2d 341, 343 (10th Cir. 1991).   
Thus, a substitute return prepared under § 6020(b) is not a “taxpayer’s return” 
within the meaning of § 63(e)(2).  Jahn contends that, if a substitute return qualifies as a 
return for some purposes, due process and equal protection require that it constitute a 
return for every purpose.  We find no basis for Jahn’s constitutional challenge.2  The 
Commissioner gave Jahn the standard deduction to which he was entitled.  If Jahn wanted 
to itemize deductions, he should have filed his own return and made the appropriate 
election as he was invited to do by the Commissioner.  Since he did not do so, he is not 
entitled to itemize deductions for the 2006 tax year.   
                                                 
2
 Furthermore, we reject Jahn’s suggestion that he was unconstitutionally 
threatened by the Tax Court. 
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Jahn also argues that the Tax Court abused its discretion in imposing a penalty 
under § 6673.  “When taxpayers are on notice that they may face sanctions for frivolous 
litigation, the tax court is within its discretion to award sanctions under section 6673,” so 
long as the sanction does not exceed $25,000.  Wolf v. Comm’r, 4 F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 
1993); see I.R.C. § 6673(a)(1).  An argument is frivolous “if it is contrary to established 
law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.”  Coleman 
v. Comm’r, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986).     
First, Jahn’s contention that he was never warned that his positions lacked merit is 
flatly controverted by the record.  The Commissioner specifically notified Jahn in a 
pretrial letter that he intended to seek penalties under § 6673 if Jahn persisted in arguing 
that he was entitled to itemize deductions without filing a return.  Furthermore, the 
Commissioner clearly stated in his pretrial memorandum and in his opening argument at 
trial that he sought penalties in light of that argument as well as Jahn’s argument that the 
complexity of the tax code prevented him from filing a return.  Indeed, when directly 
questioned by the Tax Court on the issue, Jahn acknowledged receiving notice that his 
positions were meritless. 
Second, we do not believe that the Tax Court abused its discretion in penalizing 
Jahn for advancing groundless positions.  The Tax Court found Jahn’s argument that he 
should not be compelled to file a tax return given the complexity of the tax code akin to 
tax protester-type arguments wholly lacking in merit.  The Tax Court also noted that Jahn 
continued to pursue arguments that he had unsuccessfully advanced with respect to the 
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2004 tax year, i.e., that he should be entitled to itemize.  We agree that Jahn’s arguments 
have no support in the law and conclude that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in 
penalizing Jahn $10,000.
3
  See Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(upholding penalty for argument that, while not foreclosed by precedent, was 
representative of arguments that had been universally rejected, especially since petitioner 
“previously raised a similar unsuccessful challenge in Tax Court”); Stearman v. Comm’r, 
436 F.3d 533, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding $12,500 penalty per case when taxpayer 
advanced arguments “characteristic of tax-protester rhetoric”) (quotations omitted).   
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Tax Court. 
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 Jahn argues that he should not have been penalized because he did not advance 
any of the arguments posted on the Internal Revenue Service’s website, which 
provides a list of arguments that have repeatedly found by courts to be frivolous.  
Frivolous Tax Arguments in General, Internal Revenue Service (Jan. 1, 2011), 
www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=159932,00.html.  While that list may provide 
useful guidance to taxpayers, it is by no means exclusive and does not preclude 
imposition of a penalty for arguments that are not specifically identified.   
